How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?
The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change--whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Charness, Gary ; Frechette, Guillaume R. ; Kagel, John H. |
Published in: |
Experimental Economics. - Springer, ISSN 1386-4157. - Vol. 7.2004, 2, p. 189-205
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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