How should cartels react to entry triggered by demand growth?
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Correira-da-Silva, João ; Pinho, Joana ; Vasconcelos, Helder |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1682, ZDB-ID 2268326-4. - Vol. 15.2015, 1, p. 209-255
|
Subject: | collusion | demand growth | optimal penal codes | reactions to entry | Theorie | Theory | Markteintritt | Market entry | Kartell | Cartel | Nachfrage | Demand | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy |
Extent: | graph. Darst. |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0164 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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