How the Value of Information Shapes the Value of Commitment Or: Why the Value of Commitment Does Not Vanish
Year of publication: |
2014-02
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Authors: | Hörtnagl, Tanja ; Kerschbamer, Rudolf |
Institutions: | Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik |
Subject: | Value of Information | Value of Commitment | Sequential Move Game | Imperfect Observability | Stackelberg Duopoly | First-Mover Advantage |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | 2 pages long |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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Hörtnagl, Tanja, (2014)
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Hörtnagl, Tanja, (2014)
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Strategic Information Acquisition.
Sasaki, Dan, (1997)
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Heterogeneity in Rent-Seeking Contests with Multiple Stages: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services - Theory and Experiment
Beck, Adrian, (2010)
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The Hidden Costs of Tax Evasion - Collaborative Tax Evasion in Markets for Expert Services
Balafoutas, Loukas, (2014)
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