How to sell in a sequential auction market
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Hendricks, Kenneth ; Wiseman, Thomas |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 17.2022, 4, p. 1451-1471
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | auctions | competing mechanisms | Dynamic mechanism design |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE4768 [DOI] 1830264818 [GVK] RePEc:the:publsh:4768 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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How to sell in a sequential auction market
Hendricks, Kenneth, (2022)
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Lester, Benjamin, (2017)
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