Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Sadiraj, Vjollca ; Tuinstra, Jan ; Van Winden, F. A. A. M.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Interessenvertretung \| Interest group \| Wahlkampf \| Electoral campaign

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 3014
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1590164 [DOI]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316216