Identifying Reaction Functions in a Differential Oligopoly Game with Sticky Prices

We investigate the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity in a Cournot differential game with sticky prices. We show that first order conditions do not produce instantaneous best reply functions. However, we identify negatively sloped reaction functions in steady state, with the open-loop best reply being flatter than its closed-loop counterpart.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea
Publisher:	Bologna : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Subject:	Oligopol \| Preisrigidität \| Theorie \| Taylor-Regel

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Series:	Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; 530
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4760 [DOI] 497314495 [GVK] hdl:10419/159371 [Handle] RePEc:bol:bodewp:530 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651424