Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics
We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high "clout" groups, with disproportionately many "swing" voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to "Director's Law," which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Dixit, Avinash ; Londregan, John |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 113.1998, 2, p. 497-529
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
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