Imachi Nkwu: Trade and the commons
The conventional view is that an increase in the value of a natural resource can lead to private property over it. Many Igbo groups in Nigeria, however, curtailed private rights over palm trees in response to the palm produce trade of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I present a simple game between a resource owner and a thief. An increase in the resource price leads the owner to prefer a communal harvesting arrangement that simplifies monitoring, leaving the thief no worse off. I use this model along with colonial court records to explain property disputes in interwar Igboland.
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fenske, James |
Institutions: | Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Department of Economics |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Ecology, trade and states in pre-colonial Africa
Fenske, James, (2012)
-
African polygamy: Past and present
Fenske, James, (2012)
-
1807: Economic shocks, conflict and the slave trade
Fenske, James, (2014)
- More ...