Imitation and the incentive to contribute early in a sequential public good game
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Cartwright, Edward ; Patel, Amrish |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 12.2010, 4, p. 691-708
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Subject: | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Imitationsstrategie | Imitation strategy | Theorie | Theory |
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