Impact of Sex on Worker’s Effort within Efficiency Wage Setting

We provided a simple equilibrium model where both the wage paid by firms and the sexual frequency of their workers are determined in equilibrium. The analysis is carried out within an efficiency wage model where the worker's effort is influenced, in addition to wage, by the willingness to work. The concept of equilibrium used in this paper is that of Nash

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Loureiro, Paulo R. A.
Other Persons:	Moreira, Tito Belchior Silva (contributor) ; Orrillo, Jaime (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Effizienzlohn \| Efficiency wages \| Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes \| Collective bargaining theory \| Prostitution

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (3 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Theoretical Economics Letters, 2012 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 12, 2012 erstellt
Classification:	J20 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation. General ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066645