Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Cripps, Martin ; Mailath, George J. ; Samuelson, Larry
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Reputation \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (50 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.322160 [DOI]
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112375