Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment : an experimental study
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Ambrus, Attila ; Greiner, Ben |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 102.2012, 7, p. 3317-3332
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Subject: | Experiment | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Soziales Verhalten | Social behaviour | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Theorie | Theory |
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