Imperfect transparency and the strategic use of information : an ever present temptation for central bankers?
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Viegi, Nicola |
Published in: |
The Manchester School. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0025-2034, ZDB-ID 1418920-3. - Vol. 71.2003, 5, p. 498-520
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Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Theorie | Theory |
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