Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism
Year of publication: |
May 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Aragonés, Enriqueta ; Xefteris, Dimitrios |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 58.2017, 2, p. 439-471
|
Subject: | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory |
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