Implementation in Generic Environments
In this paper, we study implementation in "economic environments". It is shown that there is a dense subset of the set of preference profiles such that given an arbitrary social choice function, f and e > 0, there exits another social choice function g, g within e of f uniformly, and g implementable in Nash equilibrium on the dense subset.
Year of publication: |
1992-05
|
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Authors: | Bergin, James ; Sen, Arunava |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Queen's University |
Saved in:
freely available
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