Implementation in vNM Stable Set

We fully identify the class of social choice functions that are implementable in von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by a rights structure. A rights structure formalizes the idea of power distribution in a society. Following Harsanyi’critique (Harsanyi, 1974), we also study implementation problems in vNM stable set that are robust to farsighted reasoning

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Korpela, Ville ; Lombardi, Michele ; Saulle, Riccardo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (54 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 11, 2022 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4187843 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244124