Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

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Authors:	Carmen Bevi?Author-Email: Carmen.Bevia@uab.es ; Luis C. Corch?n ; Wilkie, Simon
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	Market Games \| Implementation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	2 pages long
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D40 - Market Structure and Pricing. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572139