Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms.
Consider the problem of Bayesian implementation, i.e., of constructing mechanisms with the property that all Bayesian equilibrium outcomes agree with a given choice rule. The authors show that a general procedure is to start with an incentive-compatible revelation mechanism, and then augment agents' message spaces in order to eliminate undesired equilibria. Specifically, they present an augmented revelation principle, which states that if there exists any mechanism that implements a given choice rule, then an augmented revelation mechanism will also implement it. This principle enables the authors to obtain necessary conditions for implementation. For a large class of environments, these conditions are also sufficient. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Mookherjee, Dilip ; Reichelstein, Stefan |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 57.1990, 3, p. 453-75
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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