Implementation with interdependent valuations
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | MacLean, Richard P. ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 923-952
|
Subject: | Auctions | incentive compatibility | mechanism design | interdependent values | ex post incentive compatibility | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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