Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Corchón, Luis C. ; Triossi, Matteo |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 36.2011, 2, p. 179-198
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Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Vollkommene Information | Complete information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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