Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism

This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial endowments are private information and unreported endowments are consumed (withheld) but are not destroyed. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. Besides, we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and discontinuous.

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Year of publication:	1991-05
Authors:	Tian, Guoqiang
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Lindahl allocations \| withholding mechanism

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 2.22(1993): pp. 169-179
Classification:	D6 - Welfare Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109041