Implementing the commitment solution via discretionary policy-making
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hahn, Volker |
Published in: |
Macroeconomic dynamics. - Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISSN 1469-8056, ZDB-ID 1501533-6. - Vol. 27.2023, 7, p. 1866-1892
|
Subject: | Commitment | Discretion | Optimal Delegation | Reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Mitarbeiterbindung | Employee retention |
-
Rules without commitment : reputation and incentives
Dovis, Alessandro, (2021)
-
Escaping expectation traps : how much commitment is required?
Himmels, Christoph, (2012)
-
Escaping expectation traps : how much commitment is required?
Himmels, Christoph, (2013)
- More ...
-
Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?
Hahn, Volker, (2001)
-
Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils
Hahn, Volker, (2001)
-
Designing Monetary Policy Committees
Hahn, Volker, (2015)
- More ...