Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions

In the context of a stylised gaine theoretical framework of capital tax competition, we show that when repeated policy interactions are associated to a systematic punishment of the deviating policymaker, a coordinated outcome can be the solution to the non cooperative tax game. This resuit suggests that explicit forms of policy coordination, such as a centralised tax authority, could in fact be largely unnecessary.

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Year of publication:	2006-03-01
Authors:	CATENARO, Marco ; VIDAL, Jean-Pierre
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	Policy coordination \| international fiscal issues

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Sciences Economiques Number 2006011 1 pages long
Classification:	E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985463