Improving Public Good Supply and Income Equality : Facing a Trade-Off

It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of inequality that is needed for producing this result may be moderate what in particular is shown through an example with CES preferences

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Buchholz, Wolfgang ; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Einkommensverteilung \| Income distribution \| Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8786
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3754677 [DOI]
Classification:	D31 - Personal Income, Wealth and Their Distributions ; H41 - Public Goods ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314755