Impure altruism in dictators' giving

We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66% of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Korenok, Oleg ; Millner, Edward L. ; Razzolini, Laura
Published in:	Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 97.2013, C, p. 1-8
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Dictator game \| Impure altruism \| Incomplete crowding out

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; D64 - Altruism ; H30 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents. General ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608541