Incentive-compatible matching mechnisms : consistency with various stability notions
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yenmez, M. Bumin |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 5.2013, 4, p. 120-141
|
Subject: | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Matching | Öffentliche Sozialleistungen | Social security benefits | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Theorie | Theory |
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