Incentive compensation and the likelihood of termination : theory and evidence from real estate organizations
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Hallman, Greg ; Hartzell, Jay C. ; Parsons, Christopher A. |
Published in: |
Real estate economics : journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. - Malden, MA : Wiley Periodicals, Inc., ISSN 1080-8620, ZDB-ID 1234653-6. - Vol. 39.2011, 3, p. 507-546
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Subject: | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Führungskräfte | Managers | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance | Kündigung | Dismissal | Immobilienwirtschaft | Real estate industry | USA | United States |
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