Incentive contracts for teams : experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
November 2015
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Authors: | Landeo, Claudia ; Spier, Kathryn E. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 119.2015, p. 496-511
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Subject: | Moral hazard in teams | Prisoner's dilemma | Stag-hunt games | Infinitely repeated games | Communication | Reciprocity | Laboratory experiments | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Experiment | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Gefangenendilemma | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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