Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a Principal-Agent Model
Year of publication: |
2012-08
|
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Authors: | Dietl, Helmut M. ; Grossmann, Martin ; Lang, Markus ; Wey, Simon |
Institutions: | Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät |
Subject: | Principal-agent model | bonus tax | executive compensation | incentive | pay regulation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 313 30 pages |
Classification: | H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) |
Source: |
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