Incentive Provision When Contracting is Costly
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Kvaloy, Ola ; Olsen, Trond E. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Anreiz | Incentives | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) |
---|---|
Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 31, 2010 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1676135 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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