Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Loginova, Oksana ; Lu, Haibin ; Wang, X. Henry
Published in:	Topics in Theoretical Economics. - Berkeley Electronic Press. - Vol. 9.2009, 1, p. 1501-1501
Publisher:	Berkeley Electronic Press
Subject:	peer-to-peer networks \| file sharing incentive schemes \| mechanism design

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	oai:bepress:bejte-1501
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579561