Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets
We present an agent-based model of a multi-tier energy market. We show how reward interdependence between strategic business units within a vertically integrated firm can increase its profits in oligopolistic energy markets. The effects are shown to be distinct from those of the raising rivals' costs model. In our case, higher prices relate to the nature of energy markets, which facilitate the emergence of financial netback effects.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Micola, Augusto Rupérez ; Banal-Estañol, Albert ; Bunn, Derek W. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 67.2008, 2, p. 381-393
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
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