Incentives and the Core of an exchange economy: A survey

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Minelli, Enrico ; Vohra, Rajiv
Publisher:	Providence, RI : Brown University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Core \| Asymmetrische Information \| Allgemeines Gleichgewicht \| Ökonomischer Anreiz \| Theorie \| Asymmetric information \| Incentive compatibility \| Exchange economy

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2000-22
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	323832482 [GVK] hdl:10419/80100 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318870