Incentives for Auditor Collusion in Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Regulatory Environment

This paper develops a single-play game theory model that looks at the strategic interactions between auditors and managers. This paper adds to the literature by explicitly modeling the possibility of collusion in a context where the outcome is unverifiable and the manager has the possibility of funding side-payments in such a way that they have little effect on his personal payoff

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Year of publication:	[2013]
Authors:	Brown, Abigail B.
Publisher:	[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] ; Abstract [doi.org]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 20, 2007 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.976169 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation ; K22 - Corporation and Securities Law ; M49 - Accounting and Auditing. Other ; M41 - Accounting
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711461