Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents.

This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing incentive schemes under bounded rationality. It starts from a standard principal-agent model and then superimposes an assumption of boundedly rational behavior on the part of the agent. Boundedly rational behavior is modeled as an explicit optimization procedure which combines gradient dynamics with a specific form of social learning called imitation of scope.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Basov, S.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics
Subject:	RATIONALITY \| ECONOMIC MODELS \| BEHAVIOUR

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Series:	Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 813 33 pages
Classification:	C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750828