Incentives for Journal Editors
Scholars may become journal editors because editors may generate more citations of their own works. This paper empirically establishes that a scholar's publications are more likely to be cited by papers in a journal that is edited by the scholar. We then test if editors exercise influence on authors to cite editors papers by either pressuring authors (editorpressure hypothesis) or accepting articles with references to the editors papers (editorselection hypothesis), by using the keyword analysis and the forward citation analysis, respectively. We find no evidence for the two hypotheses, which leaves selfselection as a possible cause for the editor effect. JEL classification: J01
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Kim, Jinyoung ; Koh, Kanghyock |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 47.2014, 1, p. 348-371
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Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
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