Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
This paper considers some package auctions with known single-minded bidders. A single-minded bidder is interested in a unique bundle of goods and bids only for that bundle. We examine each bidder's incentive in Ausubel and Milgrom's (2002) ascending proxy auction and every bidder-optimal core-selecting auction. We provide a simple condition for each bidder to report his valuation truthfully, which can be expressed in a single sentence--any "rival" of my "rivals" is my "rival." The Vickrey outcome lies in the core if and only if this condition holds for every bidder; however, it is rarely satisfied.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Sano, Ryuji |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 72.2011, 2, p. 602-606
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Package auction Core-selecting auction Ascending proxy auction Single-minded bidder |
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