Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting
Year of publication: |
December 2016
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Authors: | Gillan, Stuart L. ; Nguyen Nga |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 41.2016, p. 445-465
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Subject: | CEO compensation | Holdbacks | Termination incentives | Contracting | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Anreiz | Incentives |
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