Incentives to innovate in oligopolies

In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay for a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non-monotonic, different, and potentially opposite ways.

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Year of publication:	2006-02
Authors:	BELLEFLAMME, Paul ; VERGARI, Cecilia
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	innovation \| proﬁt incentive \| oligopoly \| product dierentiation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CORE Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2006014
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043559