Incentives to Innovate in Oligopolies

In the spirit of Arrow (1962), we examine, in an oligopoly model with horizontally differentiated products, how much a firm is willing to pay or a process innovation that it would be the only one to use. We show that different measures of competition (number of firms, degree of product differentiation, Cournot vs Bertrand) affect incentives to innovate in non-monotonic, different, and potentially opposite ways

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Belleflamme, Paul ; Vergari, Cecilia
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Innovation \| Theorie \| Theory \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Produktdifferenzierung \| Product differentiation \| Marktstruktur \| Market structure

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 2006 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.914152 [DOI]
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057159