Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability
Year of publication: |
April 1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chang, Howard F. |
Other Persons: | Sigman, Hilary (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit | Arbitration | Haftung | Liability |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
---|---|
Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w7096 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w7096 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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