Incentives versus insurance in the design of tax-financed unemployment insurance
Year of publication: |
June 2016
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Authors: | Andersen, Torben M. |
Published in: |
International journal of economic theory. - Richmond, Vic. : Wiley Publishing Asia, ISSN 1742-7355, ZDB-ID 2206587-8. - Vol. 12.2016, 2, p. 127-150
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Subject: | search | incentive | risk sharing | unemployment benefit | Arbeitslosenversicherung | Unemployment insurance | Theorie | Theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Arbeitsuche | Job search |
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