Incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness in the random assignment setting with indifferences
Year of publication: |
November 2017
|
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Authors: | Aziz, Haris ; Luo, Pang ; Rizkallah, Christine |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 160.2017, p. 46-49
|
Subject: | Social choice theory | Random assignment problem | Probabilistic serial | Strategyproofness | Stochastic dominance | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Allokation | Allocation | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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