Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle
For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet principle.
Year of publication: |
1998-08-06
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Authors: | Kelly, Jerry S. ; Campbell, Donald E. |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 15.1998, 4, p. 583-592
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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