Incomplete contracts as a screening device in competing vertical inter-firm relationships
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sicoli, Marta ; Sorge, Marco M. |
Published in: |
Revue d'économie industrielle. - Liège : De Boeck, ISSN 0154-3229, ZDB-ID 420834-1. - Vol. 147.2014, 3, p. 141-181
|
Subject: | Vertically Integrated Firms | Asymmetric Information | Incomplete Contracts | Screening | Theorie | Theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Signalling | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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