Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries, and a Director’s Duty to Creditors
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Keay, Andrew R. |
Other Persons: | Zhang, Hao (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Führungskräfte | Managers | Treuhänder | Fiduciary | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (37 p) |
---|---|
Series: | Melbourne Univeristy Law Review ; Vol. 32, No. 1, 2008 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2008 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1788602 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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