Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 183.2019, p. 1-4
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Subject: | Incomplete contracts | Joint ownership | Limited liability | Property rights | Rent seeking | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Beschränkte Haftung | Haftung | Liability | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights | Rent-Seeking | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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