Incomplete information in monetary policy games : rules rather than a conservative central banker
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lossani, Marco |
Other Persons: | Natale, Piergiovanna (contributor) ; Tirelli, Patrizio (contributor) |
Published in: |
Scottish journal of political economy : the journal of the Scottish Economic Society. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0036-9292, ZDB-ID 219222-6. - Vol. 45.1998, 1, p. 33-47
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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