Incomplete-Information Models of Large Economies with Anonymity : Existence and Uniqueness of Common Priors

The paper provides a specification of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior. Under the given conditions, the common prior is unique

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Hellwig, Martin F.
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Series:	MPI Collective Goods Preprint ; No. 2011/8
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2011 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1839227 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125259