Inconsistent Time Preferences and On-the-Job Search - When it Pays to Be Naive

We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees who can conduct on-the-job search. Presuming that firms cannot offer long-term contracts, we find that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, they search more, which partially counteracts the inefficiencies caused by their present bias

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Fahn, Matthias
Other Persons:	Seibel, Regina (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Suchtheorie \| Search theory \| Intertemporale Entscheidung \| Intertemporal choice

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7604
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3377701 [DOI]
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General ; J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials by Skill, Training, Occupation, etc ; J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871758